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Abstract
Publishing data about patients that contain both demographics and diagnosis codes is es-
sential to perform large-scale, low-cost medical studies. However, preserving the privacy and
utility of such data is challenging, because it requires: (i) guarding against identity disclo-
sure (re-identification) attacks based on both demographics and diagnosis codes, (ii) ensuring
that the anonymized data remain useful in intended analysis tasks, and (iii) minimizing the
information loss, incurred by anonymization, to preserve the utility of general analysis tasks
that are difficult to determine before data publishing. Existing anonymization approaches
are not suitable for being used in this setting, because they cannot satisfy all three require-
ments. Therefore, in this work, we propose a new approach to deal with this problem. We
enforce the requirement (i) by applying (k, km)-anonymity, a privacy principle that prevents
re-identification from attackers who know the demographics of a patient and up to m of
their diagnosis codes, where k and m are tunable parameters. To capture the requirement
(ii), we propose the concept of utility constraint for both demographics and diagnosis codes.
Utility constraints limit the amount of generalization and are specified by data owners (e.g.,
the healthcare institution that performs anonymization). We also capture requirement (iii),
by employing well-established information loss measures for demographics and for diagnosis
codes. To realize our approach, we develop an algorithm that enforces (k, km)-anonymity
on a dataset containing both demographics and diagnosis codes, in a way that satisfies the
specified utility constraints and with minimal information loss, according to the measures.
Our experiments with a large dataset containing more than 200, 000 electronic health records
show the effectiveness and efficiency of our algorithm.
Keywords: Privacy, Demographics; Diagnosis codes; Utility constraints; Generalization;
Suppression
Preprint submitted to Elsevier
1. Introduction
Healthcare organizations collect increasingly large amounts of data, including clinical
trials, Electronic Health Records (EHR), disease registries, and medical imaging databases.
In fact, the estimated amount of healthcare data in the world was 0.5 Exabytes (0.5 · 1018
bytes) in 2012 and is expected to reach 25 Exabytes by 2020 [66]. Healthcare data are
essential for performing large-scale, low-cost analyses [18], which range from Genome-Wide
Association Studies (GWAS) to predictive modeling [9, 32] and have the potential to improve
medical research and practice. For instance, the study in [14] used more than 350,000 records
of the Scandinavian Donations and Transfusions database, along with the donors’ and the
recipients’ health records, to answer whether blood transfusions transmit cancer, and it
had a substantial impact on public health policies regarding restrictions placed on blood
donors [3, 13]. Another study [75] used an EHR database of over 300,000 records, to learn
meaningful comorbidities, which are associated with different stages of Chronic Obstructive
Pulmonary Disease (COPD). This study has the potential to improve COPD prognosis, drug
development, and clinical trial design.
While the value of analyzing healthcare data is widely recognized, data sharing remains
an obstacle for the majority of healthcare providers [17]. In particular, the privacy-preserving
sharing of healthcare data beyond authorized recipients (e.g., researchers or employees of
the institution that has collected the data) is challenging [15, 16, 25]. This is partly because
it cannot be facilitated based on access control and encryption-based methods [59, 65], or by
relying solely on policies (e.g., the HIPAA Privacy Rule [57] in the US, the Anonymization
Code [56] in the UK, and the Data Protection Directive [58] in the EU). In fact, a major
concern in healthcare data publishing is identity disclosure (or re-identification), an attack in
which patients are linked with their records in the published dataset. Identity disclosure can
be performed, even when the published dataset is devoid of direct identifiers (e.g., patient
phone numbers), due to the availability of external data sources that can be linked to the
published dataset, based on demographics [67] or diagnosis codes [47]. For example, Sweeney
estimated that 87% of US citizens can be re-identified based on gender, date of birth, and ZIP
code, while Golle [27] estimated this percentage as 63%, using newer, Census 2000 data. In
addition, Loukides et. al [44] showed that 96% of 2700 patients, who are involved in an
NIH-funded GWAS, are uniquely re-identifiable based on their set of diagnosis codes. In
response, various methods have been proposed to prevent identity disclosure when publishing
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a dataset that contains demographic attributes (e.g., [16, 39, 64, 79]), or diagnosis codes (e.g.,
[24, 31, 47, 70]).
In this work, we consider the problem of preventing identity disclosure when we need
to publish datasets containing both demographics and diagnosis codes, henceforth termed
RT -datasets. Such datasets are used in many applications [61]. Here, we provide some
recent examples:
1. The CMS-HCC risk adjustment model [28] uses demographics and diagnoses of health
insurance beneficiaries, to predict the health costs of a US health insurance program,
called Medicare Advantage. In particular, beneficiaries’ demographics (e.g., gender,
aged/disabled status, and whether a beneficiary lives in a certain community or close
to an institution) and diagnostic data are used to build and update the risk model.
The data are provided from hospital inpatient, hospital outpatient, and physicial risk
adjustment data.
2. Various epidemiological [11, 26, 62] and cancer research [36] studies are based on
data containing demographics and diagnosis codes of patients in New South Wales
(NSW), Australia. For example, the study of [36] used the data of women over 45 who
are associated with certain diagnosis and procedural codes indicating invasive breast
cancer. These data were obtained from the NSW Cancer Registry and from several
routinely-collected administrative and self-reported health datasets in NSW, and they
were analyzed to find out their predictive power in identifying invasive breast cancer
cases.
3. The study of [7] uses a dataset containing demographics and ICD-9 diagnosis codes
of patients from various US hospitals, to identify groups of patients that are likely to
be diagnosed with diabetes, based on their demographics. In particular, it uses multi-
label learning algorithms [74], to estimate the risk that each patient has for being
diagnosed with diabetes, based on multiple demographics, such as race, gender, and
age group.
These applications use data that are devoid of direct identifiers and thus potentially sus-
ceptible to identity disclosure. However, their authors recognize the need for algorithms that
anonymize both demographics and diagnosis codes, in order to prevent identity disclosure
[7] and increase data availability [36]. Also, publishing RT -datasets is important to support
analysis tasks, including case count studies [46, 54], which require accurately counting the
number of patients associated with specific demographics and diagnosis codes, predictive
modeling, and query answering [61].
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However, anonymizing an RT -dataset in a utility-preserving way is a very challenging
task. This was acknowledged in [54], which is the first work that studied the general problem
of anonymizing an RT -dataset. As explained in Section 2, our work differs from that of [54]
in terms of five main dimensions (anonymization principle, data transformation operation,
support of utility constraints, information loss criterion, and anonymization algorithm).
Specifically, there are three challenges entailed in the anonymization of an RT -dataset in a
utility-preserving way. First, identity disclosure cannot be prevented by applying existing
methods on demographics and on diagnosis codes separately. This is because an attacker
with knowledge of both demographics and diagnosis codes can still re-identify a patient,
when the combination of demographics and diagnosis codes of the patient is unique in the
anonymized dataset [61]. Specifically, the probability of re-identifying a patient based on
such a combination is the reciprocal of the frequency of the combination in the anonymized
dataset. Second, data utility must be preserved. This requires constructing an anonymized
RT -dataset which allows performing: (i) intended analysis tasks with no loss of accuracy,
and (ii) general analysis tasks, which are difficult to determine before data publishing, with
minimum loss of accuracy.
However, the existing methods for anonymizing RT -datasets [54, 61, 68] may substan-
tially reduce the accuracy of intended analysis tasks, or incur excessive information loss,
which reduces the accuracy of general analysis tasks. Specifically, the method of [54] does
not preserve data truthfulness, because it is based on noise addition. That is, it produces
synthetic data. Such data are useful for general statistical analysis or mining tasks and can
offer strong privacy guarantees [54]. However, the fact that they contain fake information
about patients makes them unsuitable for certain applications. For example, they may lead
to false alarms in epidemiology [8]. Therefore, our focus is on an anonymization approach
that produces truthful data. In addition, the methods of [61] and [68] do not preserve both
aspects of data utility; the output of [61] is of little use in intended tasks and that of [68]
incurs substantial information loss, which affects the output of general analysis tasks. To
illustrate the challenges of anonymizing an RT -dataset, we provide Example 1.
Example 1. Consider the RT-dataset D in Figure 1a. Age, Origin and Gender are demo-
graphic attributes, and Disease is a set containing diagnosis codes, whose description is
presented in Figure 2. The dataset in Figure 1b was produced by applying the method of [78]
on the demographic attributes and the method of [45] on Disease. In particular, the latter
dataset satisfies 2-anonymity [67] and 22-anonymity [50, 71], because no record contains a
unique combination of demographic values, or a unique combination of two or fewer diagno-
sis codes (the result of generalizing diagnosis codes is enclosed in () and interpreted as any
combination of the codes). However, an attacker who knows the demographics and two di-
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agnosis codes of a patient can still re-identify patients. For example, an attacker who knows
that Zoe is a 30-year-old Female from Spain, diagnosed with 493.2 (Chronic obstructive asthma)
and 494.1 (Bronchiectasis with acute exacerbation), can associate her with the record 3 of the
dataset in Figure 1b.
Consider also that the RT-dataset in Figure 1a needs to support a study which requires
counting the number of patients who are at most 50 and are diagnosed with 494.1. Applying
the method of [61] (respectively, of [68]) produces the anonymized dataset in Figure 1c (re-
spectively, in Figure 1d). However, these datasets cannot support the study, since the number
of records corresponding to patients at most 50 who are diagnosed with 494.1 cannot be ac-
curately determined. This is because the Age values of the records 0 to 4 have been replaced
with the range (interval) [19:51] in Figure 1c, while 494.1 has been generalized together with
other diagnosis codes in Figure 1d.
To address these challenges, our work makes the following specific contributions.
Utility constraints for RT -datasets. We investigate how to model and enforce the re-
quirement of supporting case count studies with no accuracy loss. We propose the
concept of utility constraint for RT -datasets, building upon previous work on diagno-
sis codes [46, 50]. A utility constraint represents the least preferred way of generalizing
the values of a record in terms of information loss, so that the record does not affect
the accuracy of an intended study. For example, the utility constraint
u = {[19:50],All,All, {494.1}}
dictates that:
• a value in Age must be replaced with the range [19:50] or any range contained in
[19:50],
• a value in Origin (respectively, in Gender) can be replaced with the most general
value All or with any other value in the domain of Origin (respectively, Gender),
and
• the diagnosis code 494.1 must be left intact.
Generalizing a record in an RT -dataset as specified by the utility constraint u, ensures
that the record remains useful for the study in Example 1. For instance, record 0 of
Figure 3 is generalized according to u and does not affect the accuracy of the study,
since it certainly corresponds to a patient at most 50 who is diagnosed with 494.1. To




Age Origin Gender Disease
0 John 19 France Male 493.2 494.1 053.20
1 Steve 22 Greece Male 493.2 494.1 053.71
2 Mary 28 Italy Female 494.1 053.20
3 Zoe 30 Spain Female 493.2 494.1 053.71
4 Luke 51 Algeria Male 493.2
5 Jim 51 Nigeria Male 493.2 494.1
6 Nicky 47 Ghana Female 494.1 458.1 458.21
7 Chris 44 Portugal Male 458.1 494.1
(a) An original RT -dataset D
Demographics Diagnosis codes
id
Age Origin Gender Disease
0 [19:22] Europe Male 493.2 494.1 (053.20, 053.71)
1 [19:22] Europe Male 493.2 494.1 (053.20, 053.71)
2 [28:30] Europe Female 494.1 (053.20, 053.71)
3 [28:30] Europe Female 493.2 494.1 (053.20, 053.71)
4 51 Africa Male 493.2
5 51 Africa Male 493.2 494.1
6 [44:47] All All 494.1 (458.1, 458.21)
7 [44:47] All All (458.1, 458.21) 494.1
(b) A version of D that is 2-anonymous with respect to demo-
graphics and 22-anonymous with respect to diagnosis codes
Demographics Diagnosis codes
id
Age Origin Gender Disease
0 [19:51] All Male 493.2 494.1 (053.20, 053.71)
1 [19:51] All Male 493.2 494.1 (053.20, 053.71)
4 [19:51] All Male 493.2
5 [19:51] All Male 493.2 494.1
6 [44:47] All All 494.1 (458.1, 458.21)
7 [44:47] All All (458.1, 458.21) 494.1
2 [28:30] Europe Female (493.2, 494.1) (053.20, 053.71)
3 [28:30] Europe Female (493.2, 494.1) (053.20, 053.71)
(c) A 22-anonymous version of D produced by [61]
Demographics Diagnosis codes
id
Age Origin Gender Disease
0 [19:22] Europe Male (493.2, 494.1, 053.20, 053.71)
1 [19:22] Europe Male (493.2, 494.1, 053.20, 053.71)
2 [28:30] Europe Female (493.2, 494.1, 053.20, 053.71)
3 [28:30] Europe Female (493.2, 494.1, 053.20, 053.71)
4 51 Africa Male (493.2, 494.1)
5 51 Africa Male (493.2, 494.1)
6 [44:47] All All (494.1, 458.1, 458.21)
7 [44:47] All All (494.1, 458.1, 458.21)
(d) A 2-anonymous version of D produced by [68]
Figure 1: An RT -dataset D and several anonymized versions. Attributes id and name are pre-
sented only for reference and are not published.
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ICD-9 code Disease
493.2 Chronic obstructive asthma
494.1 Bronchiectasis with acute exacerbation
053.20 Herpes zoster dermatitis of eyelid
053.71 Otitis externa due to herpes zoster
458.1 Chronic hypotension
458.21 Hypotension of hemodialysis
Figure 2: Diseases and their respective ICD-9 codes.
Demographics Diagnosis codes
id
Age Origin Gender Disease
0 [19:30] Europe All 493.2 494.1 (053.20, 053.71)
1 [19:30] Europe All 493.2 494.1 (053.20, 053.71)
2 [19:30] Europe All 494.1 (053.20, 053.71)
3 [19:30] Europe All 493.2 494.1 (053.20, 053.71)
6 [44:47] All All 494.1 (458.1, 458.21)
7 [44:47] All All (458.1, 458.21) 494.1
4 51 Africa Male 493.2
5 51 Africa Male 493.2
Figure 3: The (2, 22)-anonymous dataset produced by applying ArtUC to the dataset of Figure 1a.
A utility constraint set contains multiple utility constraints, which can be supported
simultaneously.
Anonymization algorithm for RT -datasets. We developArtUC , an algorithm for pub-
lishing an RT -dataset that prevents identity disclosure, allows performing intended
case count studies accurately, and incurs minimal information loss. Our algorithm
thwarts identity disclosure based on (k, km)-anonymity [61], a principle that protects
from attackers who know the demographics and up to m diagnosis codes of a patient.
(k, km)-anonymity limits the probability of patient re-identification to at most 1
k
, where
k and m are parameters selected by data owners (e.g., the data collecting healthcare
institution). ArtUC anonymizes the dataset as specified by a given utility constraint
set and with low information loss. To cope with the difficulty of minimizing the in-
formation loss of the RT -dataset, ArtUC processes the demographic attributes and
diagnosis codes separately. Specifically, our algorithm partitions the dataset into small
clusters with similar values in the demographic attributes and generalizes the values in
each cluster. After that, ArtUC merges clusters with the same generalized values and
anonymizes the diagnosis codes in each cluster. The anonymization employs generali-
zation and suppression and enforces (k, km)-anonymity in a utility-preserving way. For
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example, ArtUC produced the (2, 2
2)-anonymous dataset in Figure 3, when applied to
the dataset in Figure 1a. Notice that the probability of re-identification based on the
demographics and up to 2 diagnosis codes is at most 1
2
, while the anonymized dataset
supports the study of Example 1. In addition, the information loss is lower compared
to the datasets produced by methods of [61] and [68] (illustrated in Figures 1c and 1d
respectively).
Evaluation of ArtUC. We investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of ArtUC by con-
ducting experiments using a publicly available RT -dataset having 5 demographic at-
tributes and over 30, 000 electronic health records and an RT -dataset having 2 demo-
graphic attributes and over 200, 000 electronic health records. We also use 9 utility
constraint sets, which simulate the requirement of supporting different type of case
count studies. Our results show that our algorithm performs anonymization according
to the utility constraints and with low information loss. In addition, it takes less than
10 minutes and scales well with the dataset size and anonymization parameters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys related work. Section 3
presents the fundamental concepts used in this work and the problem statement. Section
4 presents the ArtUC algorithm, and Section 5 the experimental evaluation. Section 6
discusses extensions and limitations of our approach. Last, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Related work
In this section, we discuss anonymization methods that are closer to ours (see [15, 52, 25]
for surveys). For extensive surveys on anonymization principles and methods for healthcare
data, the reader is referred to [17,25,27]. In particular, Section 2.1 discusses algorithms
for anonymizing RT -datasets, and Section 2.2 provides a brief overview of algorithms for
anonymizing demographics and diagnosis codes.
2.1. Anonymization methods for RT-datasets
As mentioned in Section 1, methods for anonymizing an RT -dataset have been proposed
in [54, 61, 68]. More specifically, the method of Takahashi et al. [68] enforces k-anonymity
[67], which requires at least k records to have the same values in all demographic attributes
and in the set-valued attribute containing diagnosis codes. To enforce k-anonymity, it em-
ploys hierarchy-based generalization [20], effectively replacing each group of values with their
closest common ancestor in a given hierarchy. Furthermore, it applies pre-generalization,
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which generalizes some values in a pre-determined way, selected by data owners. Thus, the
method of [68] treats both demographics and diagnosis codes in the same way. As a result,
it explores a much smaller space of potential solutions than our algorithm and incurs higher
information loss. This is because it: (i) pre-generalizes attribute values, even when they can
be generalized with lower information loss (i.e., replaced with more specific values), and (ii)
employs the hierarchy-based generalization model for diagnosis codes, which was shown to
offer lower data utility than the set-based generalization model we adopt [46].
Poulis et al. [61] proposed a general framework for enforcing (k, km)-anonymity on
relational and set-valued attributes. In this framework, the RmR algorithm stands out,
since it anonymizes RT -datasets with low information loss [61]. When applied to an RT -
dataset, RmR generalizes demographic attributes so the incurred information loss remains
lower than a given threshold and performs set-valued generalization to diagnosis codes.
However, none of the algorithms in [61] allows performing intended case count studies with
no loss of accuracy, as our algorithm, ArtUC , does. Furthermore, ArtUC outperforms RmR
in terms of preserving data utility, as shown in our experiments.
Another method for anonymizing an RT -dataset was proposed by Mohammed et al.
[54]. The method enforces differential privacy [12], a strong privacy principle, which ensures
that the presence or absence of information about an individual in the dataset does not
significantly affect the outcome of analysis applied to the dataset. In other words, any
inference that an attacker can make about an individual will be (approximately) independent
of whether the individual’s record is contained in the dataset or not. To enforce differential
privacy, the method of [54] constructs a generalized contingency table, which records the
counts of all combinations of values, and then adds noise to the counts to satisfy differential
privacy. The utility goal of the method is to preserve as much information as possible for
building a classifier.
Consequently, the method of [54] differs from our work along five main dimensions:
1. It employs differential privacy, instead of (k, km)-anonymity. Thus, it aims to protect
the inference of any information about an individual. On the other hand, our method
aims to protect from identity disclosure (and can be extended to additionally protect
from attribute disclosure, as explained in Section 6).
2. It produces a synthetic dataset, which is the result from adding noise to counts, in
order to enforce privacy. Thus, it considers applications where data truthfulness is not
necessary. On the other hand, our work employs generalization and/or suppression,
which guarantee data truthfulness and make the result of our method suitable for more
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applications.
3. It does not consider utility constraints, unlike our work. Thus, it assumes a setting
where any change to the values of demographics and/or diagnosis codes is acceptable.
By employing utility constraints, our work is applicable to a more general setting.
4. It considers a different information loss criterion than our work. That is, it aims
to avoid information loss that harms the task of classification. As acknowledged by
the authors of [55], their approach is not developed for “general analysis tasks that
focus on attribute values of individual records”. On the other hand, our approach
adopts general utility measures for demographics and for diagnosis codes, which do
not consider a specific task and are able to quantify the uncertainty in interpreting
generalized values [46, 79].
5. It employs a fundamentally different algorithm to split the dataset into groups. Specif-
ically, the algorithm employed in [54] works in a top-down fashion. It starts from the
coarsest possible partition of the dataset (i.e., all records are contained in the same
group) and then iteratively partitions the dataset (i.e., spliting the group into smaller
groups), along a single attribute at a time. On the other hand, our algorithm works by
first creating groups of records around utility constraints based on demographics and
then creating clusters in a bottom-up fashion. Bottom-up anonymization algorithms
for data grouping generally explore a larger space of potential solutions that often
leads to preserving data utility better ([79]).
2.2. Anonymization methods for demographics and for diagnosis codes
A multitude of algorithms can be used to anonymize demographics. These algorithms can
be categorized based on two dimensions: (i) their privacy principle, and (ii) data transfor-
mation strategy, as shown in Figure 1. Observe that these algorithms employ the principles
of k-anonymity [67], `-diversity [51], and τ -closeness [42], which protect from different at-
tacks, and transform data using generalization and/or suppression [67], microaggregation
[10], or bucketization [76]. In the following, we discuss algorithms that apply k-anonymity
using generalization and/or suppression, since they are closer to ours. However, these algo-
rithms are not alternatives to our method, because they cannot prevent identity disclosure
in RT -datasets (i.e., protect only the demographics). These algorithms can be classified into
three categories, based on the way they work: (i) Lattice-based, (ii) Partitioning-based, and
(iii) Clustering-based.
Lattice-based algorithms employ a lattice to encode all the ways of generalizing demo-
graphics, and they search the lattice for ways that satisfy k-anonymity with minimum infor-
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Incognito with `-diversity[51] `-diversity Generalization / Suppression
Mondrian with `-diversity[77] `-diversity Generalization
Anatomize[76] `-diversity Bucketization
Incognito with τ -closeness[42] τ -closeness Generalization / Suppression
Mondrian with τ -closeness[43] τ -closeness Generalization
Table 1: Algorithms applicable on demographics.
Algorithm Principle Data transformation
Apriori[71] km-Anonymity Generalization
Disassociation[50] km-Anonymity Disassociation
UGACLIP[46] Privacy-constrained anonymity Generalization/Suppression
CBA[45] Privacy-constrained anonymity Generalization/Suppression
Greedy[80] (h, k, p)-Coherence Suppression
SuppressControl[5] ρ-Uncertainty Suppression
TDControl[5] ρ-Uncertainty Generalization/Suppression
RBAT[48] PS-rule based anonymity Generalization
Tree-based[49] PS-rule based anonymity Generalization
Sample-based[49] PS-rule based anonymity Generalization
PartialSuppression[35] ρ-Uncertainty Suppression
Table 2: Algorithms applicable on diagnosis codes.
mation loss. The search can be performed based on binary-search [63], Apriori-like heuristics
[2], and genetic algorithms [34]. Lattice-based algorithms typically incur more information
loss than Partitioning [33, 40] and Clustering-based algorithms [4, 23, 41, 78], which work
by creating groups of records albeit in different ways. For example, the Partitioning-based
algorithm in [40] creates groups using the kd-tree construction mechanism [19], while the
Clustering-based algorithm in [78] creates clusters as in bottom-up hierarchical clustering
[29]. Generally, Clustering-based algorithms incur a lower amount of information loss com-
pared to the Partitioning-based ones. Our algorithm, ArtUC , performs the anonymization
of demographics, as the Clustering-based algorithms do.
There are also various algorithms for anonymizing diagnosis codes. These algorithms
can be categorized according to their privacy principle and data transformation strategy, as
can be seen in Figure 2. These algorithms employ km-anonymity [71], privacy-constrained
anonymity [46], (h, k, p)-coherence [80], ρ-uncertainty [5], and PS-rule based anonymity [49],
and they transform diagnosis codes using generalization and/or suppression. In the follow-
ing, we discuss algorithms for enforcing km-anonymity. These algorithms are closer to ours,
because they aim to prevent identity disclosure. However, they are not alternatives to our
11
method, because they cannot protect RT -datasets (i.e., protect only the diagnosis codes).
Terrovitis et al. [71] proposed an algorithm, called Apriori Anonymization (AA), which
works iteratively in a bottom-up fashion. In each iteration, it identifies all sets of diagnosis
codes of a certain size i (initially i = 1) and applies generalization to make the dataset ki-
anonymous. Then, it considers all sets of diagnosis codes of size i+ 1 and repeats the same
process. When i = m the process ends and a km-anonymous dataset is produced. However,
AA does not allow performing intended case count studies with no loss of accuracy [46].
In response, Loukides et al. [50], proposed a method for enforcing km-anonymity by disas-
sociation [70], an operation that splits the diagnosis codes in records into non-overlapping
subsets. The method first creates clusters of records that have semantically similar diagnosis
codes and then applies disassociation to the records of each cluster to enforce km-anonymity.
However, the method of [50] does not preserve data truthfulness. Loukides et al. also pro-
posed the UGACLIP and CBA algorithms in [46] and [45], respectively. These algorithms
apply generalization and suppression, and they aim to prevent re-identification based on
specific sets of diagnosis codes that are provided as input. They apply generalization and
suppression in a way that preserves specific associations between diagnosis codes, which are
modeled as utility constraints. CBA is more effective than UGACLIP in terms of preserving
the specified associations and in terms of incurring low information loss. In ArtUC , we use
an adaptation of CBA to anonymize diagnosis codes.
3. Background and problem statement
This section discusses the fundamental concepts that are used in our approach, and it
provides the problem statement.
3.1. RT-datasets and their protection against identity disclosure
We consider a dataset in which every record corresponds to a distinct patient and contains
a number of demographic attributes, as well as a set-valued attribute containing diagnosis
codes. Such a dataset is referred to as an RT -dataset. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the first l attributes in an RT -dataset correspond to the demographic attributes,
A1, . . . , Al, and the last attribute, Al+1, is a set containing the diagnosis codes of the patient.
Extensions to this modeling dealing with multiple set-valued attributes are discussed in
Section 6. Each demographic attribute takes values from a different domain, which can be







Algeria Nigeria Greece France Germany Spain PortugalGhana
Figure 4: Hierarchies for the dataset of Figure 1a
there is an underlying hierarchy1, for each categorical demographic attribute. On the other
hand, the attribute Al+1 is a subset of the set of ICD-9 codes [46]). In addition, following
existing works [31, 44, 46, 50], we consider ICD-9 codes. If some records contain ICD-10 codes,
they can be easily mapped to ICD-9 codes, using General Equivalence Mappings, as explained
in [6].
Let us now explain how identity disclosure can be performed by an attacker on an RT -
dataset. We assume that the attacker knows all the values of a patient in each demographic
attribute, A1, . . . , Al, and up to m diagnosis codes of the attribute Al+1. Knowledge about
demographic attributes can be obtained from linking external datasets (e.g., voter lists with
hospital discharge summaries), as explained in [67]. In addition, knowledge about diagnosis
codes may be solicited from external data sources, including the electronic health record
system, as explained in [46], or be background knowledge. The parameter m is an integer,
which is set by data owners. The values of m range from 0 to the number of distinct diagnosis
codes contained in the dataset. The minimum value does not prevent identity disclosure
based on diagnosis codes, while the maximum value protects from attackers with knowledge
about any combination of diagnosis codes that a patient may have. Commonly, data owners
set m to a small constant [50], since it is unlikely for attackers to know many diagnosis codes
for a certain individual.
To prevent identity disclosure based on the aforementioned knowledge, we employ (k, km)-
anonymity [61], which is defined below.
Definition 1. An RT-dataset is (k, km)-anonymous, when an attacker who knows:
1. any combination of the demographic attributes of a patient, and
2. any combination of at most m diagnosis codes of the patient,
cannot use this knowledge to distinguish a record from at least other k − 1 records in the
dataset, where k and m are anonymization parameters specified by data owners.
1A hierarchy is a tree structure whose leaves represent the original values in an attribute and internal
nodes represent more abstract values that summarize their descendants in the tree. See, for example,
Figure 4.
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(k, km)-anonymity limits the probability of identity disclosure, based on the knowledge
specified in Items 1 and 2 of Definition 1, to at most 1/k. Clearly, larger values of k and m
achieve higher privacy protection. For example, the dataset in Figure 3 is (2, 22)-anonymous,
because an attacker who knows the values of a patient in the set of demographic attributes
{Age, Origin, Gender}, as well as up to 2 diagnosis codes, cannot re-identify the patient with
probability larger than 1
2
.
Observe that (k, km)-anonymity provides the same protection as k-anonymity [64], for
demographic attributes, and as km-anonymity [72], for the diagnosis codes attribute. How-
ever, the inverse does not hold. Specifically, an RT -dataset may be k and km but not (k, km)-
anonymous. For instance, the dataset of Figure 1b is both 2-anonymous and 22-anonymous,
but it is not (2, 22)-anonymous. Therefore, an attacker who knows the demographics and
up to 2 diagnosis codes of a patient may re-identify the patient, as discussed in Example 1.
On the contrary, this is not possible when the (2, 22)-anonymous dataset of Figure 3 is used
instead, because at least two records could belong to the patient.
3.2. Generalization, suppression and data utility quantification
To enforce (k, km)-anonymity, we may employ generalization and/or suppression. Gen-
eralization replaces a value with a more general value, while suppression deletes a value.
Both operations have been applied to anonymize demographics and/or diagnosis codes (see
Section 2). Suppression is a more drastic operation than generalization, but it is useful to
avoid generalizations of diagnosis codes that have very low data utility [46]. For generali-
zation, we apply a local recoding [39] generalization model that is inspired by [61]. Given a
cluster of records C, our model replaces the values in each attribute of the records in the
cluster, as explained below.
Definition 2. Given a cluster C, generalization replaces the values of all records in C, in
each attribute A, as follows:
If A is a numerical demographic attribute, the values are replaced by the range (in-
terval) comprised of the minimum and maximum of these values.
If A is a categorical demographic attribute, the values are replaced by their closest
common ancestor in the hierarchy of A.The common closest ancestor is the node that
belongs to every path from a value to the root of the hierarchy and is as far as possible
from the root.
If A is the set-valued attribute, each value (set of diagnosis codes) of a record in C is
replaced by one or more sets of diagnosis codes.
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Thus, the generalization model replaces the value of a record in the cluster, with respect
to an attribute, with a node in the hierarchy of the attribute, or with a range, or with
set(s) of diagnosis codes, depending on the type of the attribute. For brevity, we refer to
the result of applying generalization to a value in a demographic attribute (i.e., a node in
the hierarchy, or range) as generalized value, and to a set of diagnosis codes that is created
by applying generalization to the value in the set-valued attribute as generalized diagnosis
code. A generalized value is interpreted as a single node in the hierarchy or a range, whereas
a generalized diagnosis code is interpreted as any subset of the diagnosis codes that it has
replaced.
Note that there is a single way to replace the values in a cluster with respect to a
demographic attribute, whereas there are multiple ways to perform the same for the diagnosis
codes in the set-valued attribute. That is, our generalization model does not specify exactly
which generalized diagnosis codes will be created. This allows our anonymization algorithm
to select the best way to create generalized diagnosis codes, among a large number of possible
alternatives (exponential in the number of distinct codes in the cluster), which is important
to preserve data utility. Example 2 below illustrates our generalization model.
Example 2. Consider a cluster containing the records 6 and 7 of the RT-dataset in Figure 1a
and the result of applying the generalization model to the cluster, shown in Figure 5. Ob-
serve that the values {44,47} in the numerical demographic attribute Age have been replaced
by the range [44:47]. This implies that the records in the cluster may have any value from
44 to 47 in Age. In addition, the values {Ghana,Portugal} in the categorical demographic
attribute Origin have been replaced by their closest common ancestor All in the hierarchy for
Origin, which is shown in Figure 4. Similarly, the values {Male, Female} in the categorical
demographic attribute Gender have been replaced by their closest common ancestor All in
the hierarchy for Gender of Figure 4. Moreover, the diagnosis codes have been replaced by
the generalized diagnosis codes (494.1)2, and (458.1,458.21). The generalized diagnosis code
(494.1) is interpreted as Chronic hypotension, and the generalized diagnosis code (458.1,458.21)
is interpreted as Chronic hypotension and/or Hypotension of hemodialysis.
Clearly, our generalization model can enforce (k, km)-anonymity on an RT -dataset, when
the following conditions hold:
Condition 1: Each cluster contains at least k records with the same generalized value, in
each demographic attribute.




Age Origin Gender Disease
6 [44:47] All All 494.1 (458.1, 458.21)
7 [44:47] All All (458.1, 458.21) 494.1
Figure 5: Example of applying generalization to the cluster containing the records {6, 7} of the
dataset of Figure 1a.
Condition 2: Each combination of m or fewer diagnosis codes appears in at least k records
of the cluster (a diagnosis code appears in a generalized diagnosis codes when it has
been replaced by it after generalization).
Condition 1 (respectively, Condition 2) ensures that the attacker cannot use their knowl-
edge about the demographics (respectively, the diagnosis codes) of the patient in Definition
1 to re-identify the patient with probability that exceeds 1
k
.
There are many different ways to anonymize an RT -dataset, using generalization and/or
suppression, which do not offer the same utility. Typically, the utility of an anonymized
dataset in general analysis tasks is measured based on: (a) the amount of information loss
incurred by anonymization, and (b) the accuracy of answering aggregate queries using the
anonymized dataset.
To measure the amount of information loss, there are various utility measures that are
applicable to demographics [4, 22, 39, 79] or diagnosis codes [30, 47, 72]. For demographics,
we use the NCP (Normalized Certainty Penalty) measure [79], due to its flexibility in dealing
with both numerical and categorical demographic attributes and its ability to accurately
quantify the uncertainty in interpreting generalized values [79]. The following definitions
explain the NCP measure.




0, |v˜| = 1
|v˜|/|A|, otherwise ,
where v˜ and |A| are defined as follows.
If A is numerical, v˜ is the length of the range v˜ and |A| is the domain size of A.
If A is categorical, v˜ is the number of leaves of the subtree rooted at v˜ in the hierarchy of
A and |A| is the number of leaves in the hierarchy of A.












respectively, where wi ∈ [0, 1] is a weight that measures the importance of a demographic
attribute Ai, i ∈ [1, l] and is specified by data owners, r[Ai] denotes the projection of the
record r on the attribute Ai, and |D| is the size (number of records) of the dataset.
The NCP measure takes values in the [0, 1] range. Lower values of NCP indicate lower
data distortion and are preferable. Example 3 below illustrates the computation of the NCP
measure.
Example 3. Consider the record 6 in the anonymized RT-dataset of Figure 3. The NCP of
the generalized value [44:47] in the numerical demographic attribute Age is 47−44
51−19 = 0.094. In
addition, the NCP of the generalized value All in the categorical demographic attribute Origin
is 8
8
, because the number of leaves of the subtree rooted at All, in the hierarchy of Figure 4,
is 8, and the number of leaves in the same hierarchy is also 8. Similarly, the NCP of the
generalized value All in the categorical demographic attribute Gender is 2
2
. Thus, assuming a
weight 1
3







The NCP of the record 7 is also 0.7, and thus the NCP of the cluster {6,7} is 2 · 0.7 = 1.4.
Last, the NCP value of the anonymized dataset in Figure 3 is 4.28
8
, where 4.28 is the sum of
the NCP values of all records in the dataset.
For diagnosis codes, we use the UL (Utility Loss) [46] measure, which captures the infor-
mation loss caused by generalization and suppression and it is suitable to use together with
generalization models that replace diagnosis codes with sets [46], such as our generalization
model (see Definition 2). The following definitions explain the UL measure.
Definition 5. Given a generalized diagnosis code u˜, which has replaced |u˜| diagnosis codes
in the RT-dataset, and a weight w(u˜) ∈ [0, 1], which reflects the importance of the diagnosis
codes replaced by u˜ and is specified by data owners, the UL of u˜ is defined as:
UL(u˜) = (2|u˜| − 1) · w(u˜).




2σ(r) − 1 + s(r), UL(C) =
∑
r∈C




respectively, where σ(r) computes the total number of diagnosis codes that appear in gen-
eralized diagnosis codes in r, s(r) computes the number of diagnosis codes that have been
suppressed from r, and |D| denotes the size (number of records) of the dataset.
The UL measure takes values in the [0, 1] range. Lower values of UL indicate lower
data distortion and are preferable. Example 4 below illustrates the computation of the UL
measure.
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Example 4. Consider the record 6 in the anonymized RT-dataset of Figure 3 and assume
that the weight of each generalized diagnosis code is 1. The UL of the generalized diagnosis
code (494.1) is (20−1)·1 = 0 and that of (458.1,458.21) is (22−1)·1 = 3. This reflects that no
information loss is incurred when 494.1 is generalized to (494.1), since the generalized diagno-
sis code is interpreted as the diagnosis code 494.1. Furthermore, it reflects that (458.1,458.21)
incurs more information loss than (494.1), which is expected because (458.1,485.21) is inter-
preted as 458.1 and/or 458.21. In addition, 3 diagnosis codes (i.e., 494.1, 458.1, and 458.21)
appear in the generalized diagnosis codes in the record 6, and no diagnosis codes have been
suppressed. Thus, the UL of the record 6 is 0+3
23−1 + 0 = 0.43. Similarly, the UL of the record
7 is 0.43, and thus the UL of the cluster {6, 7} is 2 · 0.43 = 0.86. The UL of the dataset in





+ 2 · 22−1
4
+ 0 + 1)/8 = 0.441.
To measure the accuracy of answering aggregate queries using anonymized data, we
employ the ARE (Average Relative Error) measure [39]. In particular, we consider COUNT
queries that model case count studies and have the following SQL-like form:
SELECT COUNT(*)
FROM D (or D)
WHERE R and T are supported by a record r in D (or in D)
where R (respectively, T ) is a set of values in demographic attributes (respectively, a set
of diagnosis codes), and D and D is the RT -dataset before and after anonymization, re-
spectively. That is, a query asks for the number of patients with certain demographics that
are diagnosed with a set of one or more diagnosis codes. A similar setting involving only
diagnosis codes was considered in [46, 47, 70].
Lower ARE values indicate more accurate queries answers and are preferable. The
following definition explains how ARE can be computed.
Definition 7. For a workload W of COUNT queries q1, . . . , qn, and for two functions CA
and CO, which count the number of records answering a query qi, i ∈ [1, n] on the anonymized
dataset D and on the original dataset D respectively, the ARE measure is defined as:
ARE(W) = avgi∈[1,n] |CA(qi)− CO(qi)|
CO(qi)
Thus, ARE is computed as the mean error of answering all queries in the query workload
W . Clearly, a zero ARE implies that the anonymized dataset D is as useful as the original
dataset D in answering the queries in W , and low values in ARE are preferred. Note that
anonymized datasets that have low ARE values are useful not only for answering COUNT
queries but also for various analysis tasks that are based on such queries, such as frequent
itemset mining and classification [40].
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u = {[40:50],Europe,All, {053.20, 053.70}}
Table 3: An example of a utility constraint.
3.3. Utility constraints for RT-datasets
Minimizing a data utility measure, such as NCP or ARE, is important. However, it
does not guarantee that the anonymized dataset will be useful in intended analysis tasks, as
explained in Section 1. This has been recognized by prior works on anonymizing diagnosis
codes [46, 50], which proposed the concept of utility constraints (see Section 2.2).
In our work, we extend this concept to RT -datasets. Intuitively, a utility constraint
models the least preferable way in which a record can be generalized, in the sense that
applying more generalization yields the record useless for performing the intended task (i.e.,
the task is performed with lower accuracy after anonymization).
Definition 8. A utility constraint u is an ordered set {vA1 , . . . , vAl , vAl+1} where vAi, i ∈
[1, l + 1] is defined as follows:
If Ai is a numerical demographic attribute, vAi is a range of values of Ai.
If Ai is a categorical demographic attribute, vAi is a node in the hierarchy of Ai.
If Ai is the set-valued attribute, vAi is a set of diagnosis codes.
An example of a utility constraint is shown in Table 3. This utility constraint is comprised
of the range [40:50] in the numerical demographic attribute Age, the nodes Europe and All in
the hierarchy of the categorical demographic attribute Origin and Gender, respectively (see
Figure 4), and the set of the diagnosis codes 053.20 and 053.70, in the set-valued attribute.
Our definition of a utility constraint does not pose any restriction in the choice of
hierarchy nodes, ranges, or set of diagnosis codes. However, such restrictions are nec-
essary when there are multiple utility constraints, to avoid conflicts between utility con-
straints which can render the anonymized data useless for the intended task. For ex-
ample, consider the utility constraint u in Table 3 and another utility constraint u′ =
{[19:51],Germany, Female, {053.20}}. Clearly, there is a conflict between these two utility con-
straints, because u states that the least acceptable way to generalize a value in Age is to
replace it with [40:50], whereas u′ states that replacing the value with [19:51] (i.e., further
generalizing the value) is still acceptable. To avoid such conflicts, we require the set of utility
constraints to satisfy all of the following requirements.
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For each numerical demographic attribute, any two utility constraints should have
the same range or two disjoint ranges.
For each categorical demographic attribute, any two utility constraints should have
the same node or two nodes that have no common leaf-level descendant in the hierarchy
of the attribute.
For the set-valued attribute, any two utility constraints should have the same set of
diagnosis codes or two disjoint sets of diagnosis codes.
In the following, we assume that these requirements are satisfied by the specified utility
constraints. In addition, we require the specified utility constraints to cover each value in
an RT -dataset. More specifically, we require:
For each numerical demographic attribute Ai, each respective value to be contained
in the element (range) vAi of a utility constraint.
For each categorical demographic attribute Ai, each respective value to be contained
in the subtree of the hierarchy of Ai that is rooted at the element vAi of a utility
constraint.
For the set-valued attribute Al+1, each diagnosis code to be contained in the element
vAl+1 of a utility constraint.
When the specified utility constraints cover each value in an RT -dataset, the value can
be generalized by our algorithm, in a way that guarantees data utility for the intended
analysis task, as will be explained later. When there are no specific requirements for certain
attribute values, a utility constraint with a “coarse” element (e.g., All) can be specified for
these values. For example, if a case count study does not require distinguishing patients
according to their Gender, all utility constraints can have the node All in their element for
Gender. In the following, we assume that the specified utility constraints cover each value in
the given RT -dataset.
The set that contains all the utility constraints is defined as the utility constraint set and
is denoted with U . We now explain when an anonymized RT -dataset satisfies a given utility
constraint set.
Definition 9. An anonymized dataset D satisfies a given utility constraint set U when, for
each record r of D, there is a utility constraint u in U such that the following conditions
hold:
20
u1 = {[19:50],All,All, {458.1, 458.21}}
u2 = {[19:50],All,All, {053.20, 053.70}}
u3 = {[19:50],All,All, {494.1}
u4 = {[51],Africa,Male, {493.2}}
Table 4: A utility constraint set.
For each numerical demographic attribute Ai, the generalized value of r in Ai, is con-
tained in the element vAi of u.
For each categorical demographic attribute Ai, the generalized value of r of Ai is
contained in the subtree that is rooted at vAi in the hierarchy of Ai, where vAi is
the element of u.
For the set-valued attribute Al+1, and for each generalized diagnosis code of r, the di-
agnosis codes that appear in the generalized diagnosis code are contained in the element
vAl+1 of u, or of another utility constraint in U .
Thus, when a utility constraint set is satisfied, generalization does not reduce the utility
of the RT -dataset for performing the intended analysis task, because no generalized value
or generalized diagnosis code exceeds the maximum allowable level of generalization that is
dictated by the specified utility constraints.
Example 5 below illustrates when a utility constraint set is satisfied.
Example 5. The anonymized RT-dataset of Figure 3 satisfies the utility constraint set U =
{u1, u2, u3, u4}, shown in Table 4, because for each record of the anonymized dataset, its
generalized values in Age, Origin, and Gender are contained in elements of the same utility
constraint and the diagnosis codes that appear in each generalized diagnosis code are con-
tained in a single utility constraint. For example, the generalized values [19:30], Europe, and
All of record 1 are all contained in u1 (or equivalently in u2 or u3, since these two util-
ity constraints have the same elements in {Age,Origin,Gender} with u1), and the diagnosis
codes 053.20 and 053.71, which appear in the generalized diagnosis code (053.20,053.71) are
contained in the same utility constraint u2.
Note that Definition 9 does not capture the impact of suppressing diagnosis codes on
data utility. Thus, the utility constraint set in Example 5 is satisfied when 494.1 has been
suppressed from record 5. To control the impact of suppression on diagnosis codes, our
problem restricts the allowable number of diagnosis codes that can be suppressed, as we will
discuss in Section 3.4.
3.4. Problem statement
We now formally define the problem that we aim to solve in this work, as follows.
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Problem 1. Given an RT-dataset D, a utility constraint set U , parameters k and m, and
thresholds δ and , construct a (k, km)-anonymous version D of D, such that all following
requirements hold:
Requirement 1: NCP(D) ≤ δ.
Requirement 2: UL(D) is minimum.
Requirement 3: D satisfies the utility constraint set U .
Requirement 4: At most  diagnosis codes have been suppressed to construct D.
Solving Problem 1 is far from trivial for three reasons. First, the problem is compu-
tationally difficult (NP-hard), even when the utility constraint set U does not limit the
generalization of values (i.e., it contains a utility constraint with the element All for each
demographic attribute and the set of all ICD-9 codes for the set-valued attribute) [61]. Sec-
ond, the requirement to satisfy the utility constraint set, which we introduce in this paper,
calls for new methods that are able to take into account the allowable ways of generalizing
values. Third, minimizing the information loss in both demographic attributes and diagno-
sis codes together is difficult. Intuitively, this is because minimizing NCP calls for creating
small groups of records, whereas minimizing UL calls for creating large groups of records,
as explained in [61]. Thus, there is a trade-off between the information loss incurred by
generalization on demographic attributes and on diagnosis codes. To control this trade-off,
we use the thresholds δ and , which are set by data owners.
Currently, there are no algorithms for solving Problem 1.
4. Anonymization methodology
To address Problem 1, we propose the ArtUC algorithm. In the following, we explain
the operation of ArtUC (Section 4.1) and illustrate its use with an example (Section 4.2).
In addition, we propose an adaptation of ArtUC to help the data owner decide the maxi-
mum allowable information loss in the demographic attributes and the maximum allowable
suppressed diagnosis codes (Section 4.3). The adaptation is based on progressively relaxing
Requirements 1 and 4 of Problem 1.
4.1. The ArtUC algorithm
The ArtUC algorithm works in four phases:
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1. Record grouping: In this phase, groups of records are created. Each group contains
all records whose values in the set of demographic attributes are contained in the same
utility constraint.
2. Cluster formation: In this phase, each group is further split into clusters, which be-
come k-anonymous, with respect to the demographic attributes, with minimal NCP .
3. Cluster merging: The clusters created in the cluster formation phase are merged. The
objective is to create clusters whose diagnosis codes can be anonymized with low
information loss, without violating Requirement 1 of Problem 1.
4. (k, km)-anonymization: Each cluster becomes (k, km)-anonymous, by generalizing di-
agnosis codes. The generalization is performed in a way that aims to satisfy the
Requirements 2, 3, and 4 of Problem 1.
After that, the anonymized dataset, which is comprised of the (k, km)-anonymous clusters,
is returned, and the algorithms terminates. We now describe the pseudocode of ArtUC in
more detail.
Record grouping. The record grouping phase is performed in Step 1. In this phase, the
records of the RT -dataset are placed into different groups, and each record belongs to one
group that is formed around a different utility constraint. That is, the values of all records in
the group in a numerical (respectively, categorical) demographic attribute Ai are contained
in the element vAi (respectively, in the subtree of the hierarchy of Ai that is rooted at the
element vAi) of the utility constraint, for each attribute Ai, i ∈ [1, l]. The specification of
the utility constraint set (see the requirements for the specified utility constraints in Section
3.3) guarantees that each record belongs to at least one group. Typically, the created groups
contain more than k records.
This is reasonable since k is a small constant in practice. In the extreme case where
a group has fewer than k records, generalization alone cannot enforce (k, km)-anonymity.
Thus, to achieve this goal, the algorithm suppresses the records of the group (Step 2). In
our experimental analysis (Section 5), we demonstrate that such suppressions are extremely
rare for a wide range of parameter settings and utility constraint sets. Specifically, ArtUC
executed Step 2 only for k = 100 (20 times larger than the typical value) and for only one
utility constraint. As a result, fewer than 0.01% of the input records were suppressed.
Cluster formation. The cluster formation phase is performed in Steps 3 to 16. In each
iteration, a different group G ∈ G is considered and is divided into clusters, each containing
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Algorithm: ArtUC
Input: An RT -dataset D, a utility constraint set U , and anonymization parameters k, m, δ and .
Output: A (k, km)-anonymous RT -dataset D that corresponds to D, satisfies the Requirements 1, 2, and 4 of
Problem 1, and has minimal UL.
// Record grouping
1 Group the records of D into a set G of |U| groups such that the records of each group are contained in the same utility
constraint of U .
2 Remove all groups from G that have less than k records.
// Cluster formation
3 Let C be an empty set of clusters.
4 foreach group G ∈ G do // Form k-sized clusters
5 while group G has more than k records do
6 Move a random record from group G into a new cluster C.
7 while C has fewer than k records do
8 Find the record rNCP ∈ G that minimizes the NCP of C ∪ {rNCP} when generalized with Definition 2.
9 Move record rNCP from group G into cluster C.
10 Add cluster C into the set of clusters C.
11 foreach group G ∈ G do // Consider the groups with records that are not assigned in clusters
12 foreach record r in group G do
13 Find the cluster CNCP in C that minimizes the NCP of CNCP ∪ {r} when generalized with Definition 2.
14 Move r from group G into cluster CNCP .
15 Apply the generalization of Definition 2 to each cluster in the set of clusters C.
16 if NCP(C) > δ then return false ;
// Cluster merging
17 Merge all clusters of C with the same generalized values in all the demographic attributes.
18 repeat
19 Select the cluster CUL ∈ C with minimum UL when generalized with our adaptation of the CBA algorithm.
20 Search for a cluster C′UL ∈ C − CUL such that (a) CUL ∪ C′UL has minimum UL (when generalized with our
adaptation of the CBA algorithm), and (b) NCP of C − CUL − C′UL ∪ {CUL ∪ C′UL} is at most δ (when
generalized with Definition 2).
21 if C′UL exists then Remove from C clusters CUL and C′UL and add cluster CUL ∪ C′UL.;
22 until the set of clusters C does not change;
// (k, km)-anonymization
23 Let D be an empty set of clusters that will store the anonymized result.
24 foreach cluster C in C do
25 Anonymize C using our adaptation of the CBA algorithm and add to D result.
26 if the total number of suppressed diagnosis codes exceeds  then return false ;
27 return D
Algorithm 1: ArtUC
k records. This is performed by a heuristic that adds into the cluster the record that incurs
the minimum increase to the NCP value of the cluster, after generalization, until the cluster
contains k records (Steps 6 to 10). Note that NCP is measured for the cluster, after the
generalization of all its values in the demographic attributes. The generalization is performed
by applying Definition 2 to each demographic attribute. Note also that the NCP value of
the cluster cannot decrease, after the record addition (see Definition 3). Each created cluster
is also saved into the set of clusters C (Step 10).
Next, the algorithm considers the records that have not been added into clusters (Steps
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11 to 14). Clearly, in every group, there can be at most k − 1 such records; if there were
more, they would have formed a cluster. Each of these records is moved into the cluster
that fits best, in the sense that its addition incurs the lowest increase in the NCP of the
cluster. Then, the demographics of each cluster are generalized using Definition 2 (Steps
15). Following, the algorithm checks if Requirement 1 of Problem 1 is satisfied (Step 16).
Specifically, if the NCP of the resultant clustering C exceeds the parameter δ, then the
algorithm terminates, since an acceptable solution in terms of the information loss with
respect to the demographic attributes cannot be found.
Cluster merging. The cluster merging phase is performed in Steps 17 to 22. First, ArtUC
combines clusters which have the same generalized values in all demographic attributes (Step
17). Clearly, the resultant clusters are still k-anonymous, and the NCP of the set of clusters
C does not change (see Definition 4). However, the merged clusters offer more room for
minimizing the information loss of the set-valued attribute. This is because they contain
more diagnosis codes and are more likely to become km-anonymous with respect to the
diagnosis codes, with lower information loss according UL.
Subsequently, ArtUC merges together clusters with semantically close diagnosis codes
aiming at minimizing UL (Steps 18 to 22). To this end, the algorithm first selects the
cluster CUL that has the minimum UL when the diagnosis codes are anonymized (Step
19). The anonymization is performed by an adaptation of the CBA algorithm [45] (see
Section 2.2). Our adaptation enforces km-anonymity to a cluster of records, instead of
preventing re-identification based on the specified sets of diagnosis codes as CBA does (a
detailed explanation is provided in Appendix A). Following, in Step 20, ArtUC searches
for a cluster C ′UL which, if merged with CUL, results in a cluster that has:
1. minimum UL (when generalized with our adaptation of the CBA algorithm), and
2. NCP at most δ (when generalized with Definition 2).
Intuitively, C ′UL is the “closest” cluster to CUL with respect to UL that does not violate the
NCP bound set by Requirement 1 of Problem 1. If C ′UL exists, the two clusters are merged
and the algorithm attempts to merge another pair of clusters. Otherwise, the cluster merging
stops.
(k, km)-anonymization. The (k, km)-anonymization phase is performed in Steps 24 to 27.
In this phase, ArtUC generalizes the diagnosis codes in a cluster, using our adaptation of
the CBA algorithm (Step 25), and checks whether the total number of suppressed diagnosis
codes exceeds the parameter . In this case, the utility constraint set cannot be satisfied,
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and the algorithm terminates (Step 26). Otherwise, the cluster is added into an initially
empty set D that stores the output, and the next cluster is considered.
After all clusters have been considered, ArtUC returns the set D, which is comprised of
all clusters and is a (k, km)-anonymous version of the RT -dataset D (Step 27).
ArtUC is efficient and scales well with respect to the dataset size and anonymization
parameters. A time complexity analysis of our algorithm can be found in Appendix C.
4.2. Example using ArtUC
To illustrate the operation of the ArtUC algorithm, we apply it to enforce (2, 2
2)-
anonymity on the dataset of Figure 1a using the utility constraint set of Table 4. We set the
parameters of ArtUC as follows: k = 2, m = 2, δ = 0.6, and  = 2.
During the record grouping phase, the records of the dataset are split into the groups
G1 = {0,1,2,3,6,7} and G2 = {4,5} (Step 1). G1 is formed around the utility constraint u1
(or equivalently around u2 or u3, which have the same elements in {Age,Origin,Gender} with
u1), while G2 is formed around u4. Next, ArtUC considers G1 and creates the first cluster,
C1 (Steps 4 to 10). Let us assume that the record 0 is selected and moved to C1, in Step
6. Then, the record 1 is added into C1, because generalizing the demographic values of the
records 0 and 1 together results in the minimum NCP value (Steps 7–9). Similarly, ArtUC
creates the clusters C2 and C3, which contain the records {2,3} and {6,7} of G1, respectively.
After that, the algorithm considers the second group, G2, and creates the cluster C4 =
{4,5}. Since all records of the groups are assigned to clusters, Steps 11–14 are skipped. Then,
ArtUC generalizes the demographic attributes of each cluster using Definition 2 (Step 15),
as shown in Figure 1a, and proceeds into the next phase, because the NCP of the set of
clusters C = {C1, C2, C3, C4} is lower than δ (Step 16).
In the cluster merging phase, the cluster C1 has the minimum UL when generalized
(Step 19). Then, the algorithm finds the cluster C2, which satisfies both conditions (i.e., (a)
C1 ∪C2 has minimum UL, and (b) NCP of C −C1−C2 ∪ {C1 ∪C2} is at most δ) (Step 20)
and merges C1 and C2 (Step 21). Subsequently, ArtUC proceeds into the following phase,
because any further merging of clusters results in a set of clusters having a higher NCP than
δ (i.e., violates the Requirement 1 of Problem 1).
In the (k, km)-anonymization phase (Steps 24–26), the diagnosis codes in each cluster are
generalized, and the (k, km)-anonymous RT -dataset, shown in Figure 3, is returned (Step
27).
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4.3. Adaptation of ArtUC based on progressive relaxation of Requirements 1 and 4
As can be seen in the pseudocode, our algorithm produces an anonymized dataset that
satisfies Requirements 1, 3, and 4 of Problem 1 and has minimal UL, except in the following
cases:
• the NCP of the anonymized dataset with respect to the demographics exceeds the
specified δ (i.e., Requirement 1 is not satisfied), or
• the number of suppressed diagnosis codes exceeds the specified value of  (Requirement
4 is not satisfied).
In these cases, the satisfaction of the requirements is treated as a hard constraint, and the
algorithm does not produce an anonymized dataset. This algorithmic design choice clearly
reflects the semantics of utility constraints, which dictate that a group of records that is
“too” generalized is useless for analysis, and it is consistent with prior work [46, 47, 48].
An alternative design choice is to relax Requirements 1 and 4 of Problem 1 progressively,
as the algorithm is being executed, and let the data owner decide when the produced ano-
nymized dataset is useful for them (i.e., it has acceptable NCP a sufficiently low number
of suppressed diagnosis codes). This adaptation of ArtUC avoids the need for specifying δ
and  a priori and turns ArtUC into an “any time” method, in the spirit of the method of
[20]. The adaptation is straightforward, and it is performed by replacing the Steps 16 to 25
of ArtUC with the pseudocode provided in Algorithm 2 below. In summary, the adaptation
performs cluster merging and (k, km) anonymization iteratively. The merging of two clusters
increases the NCP of the anonymized dataset, and it is performed as long as the NCP and
number of suppressed diagnosis codes are deemed acceptable by the data owner. In the
following, we discuss the adaptation in more detail.
As can be seen in the pseudocode of Algorithm 2, an anonymized dataset D, comprised
of all the formed clusters, is created (steps 1 to 2), and the data owner is asked whether the
NCP of D is sufficiently low (step 3). If not, false is returned (step 4), since subsequent
cluster merging cannot decrease NCP , as mentioned above. Otherwise, the adaptation
proceeds into the cluster merging phase (steps 5 to 21). In this phase, the clusters with the
same generalized values in all demographic attributes are combined (step 6), as in ArtUC .
Then, the clusters are merged iteratively (steps 7 to 21). Differently from ArtUC , however,
each cluster, including the temporarily merged cluster C ′UL, is (k, k
m)-anonymized (steps 12
to 13), and the data owner is asked whether the NCP of the resultant dataset is sufficiently
low (step 14). If it is, the clusters and dataset are updated (steps 15 to 16), and we proceed
27
1 Anonymize each cluster in C using our adaptation of the CBA algorithm
2 D ← the set of anonymized clusters in C
3 if NCP (C) is not deemed acceptable by the data owner then
4 return false
5 else
6 Merge all clusters of C with the same generalized values in all the demographic attributes
7 repeat
8 Select the cluster CUL ∈ C with minimum UL when generalized with our adaptation of the CBA algorith .
9 Search for a cluster C′UL ∈ C − CUL such that CUL ∪ C′UL has minimum UL (when generalized with our
adaptation of the CBA algorithm)
10 if C′UL exists then
11 temp← C − CUL − C′UL ∪ {CUL ∪ C′UL}
12 Apply the generalization of Definition 2 to each cluster in temp
13 Anonymize each cluster in temp using our adaptation of the CBA algorithm
14 if NCP (temp) is deemed acceptable by the data owner then
15 Remove from C clusters CUL and C′UL and add cluster CUL ∪ C′UL
16 Update D




21 until the set of clusters C does not change;
22 return D
Algorithm 2: Adaptation of ArtUC that progressively relaxes Requirements 1 and 4 of Problem
1.
into the next iteration. Otherwise, the NCP is deemed unacceptable, and the data owner
is asked whether the number of suppressed diagnosis codes is sufficiently low (step 17). If
it is, the clusters are not merged and an anonymized dataset with acceptable NCP and
number of suppressed diagnosis codes is returned (step 18). Otherwise, false is returned,
since further cluster merging and (k, km)-anonymization can only increase the number of
suppressed diagnosis codes (steps 19 to 20). The cluster merging continues as long as the
NCP is acceptable and the set of created clusters does not change (step 21). After that, the
anonymized dataset, which has acceptable NCP and number of suppressed diagnosis codes,
is returned (step 22).
5. Experimental evaluation
In this section, we evaluate ArtUC , in terms of data utility preservation and efficiency.
We compare ArtUC with two anonymization algorithms that are applicable to RT -datasets,
namely RmR and Baseline. RmR [61] aims to minimize the overall information loss with-
out considering the intended analysis requirements (see Section 2.1). Baseline is a baseline
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# of # of distinct Max, Avg # diagnosis
Dataset |D| demographics diagnosis codes codes per record
EHRD 208, 387 2 13, 963 185, 16.21
Informs 36, 553 5 619 17, 4.27
Table 5: Description of EHRD and Informs dataset.
method, which performs record grouping and (k, km)-anonymization. Baseline is similar
in principle to the algorithm of Takahashi et al. [68], in that it pre-generalizes the demo-
graphic attributes. The Baseline algorithm works as follows. First, it creates a set of
groups of records, each of which corresponds to a different utility constraint. Then, it con-
siders each group and generalizes the demographic attributes and diagnosis codes of every
record in the group. The demographic attributes are generalized as specified by the utility
constraint corresponding to the group (i.e., the value in each attribute is replaced by the
corresponding value of the utility constraint of the group), while the diagnosis codes are
anonymized following the Steps 24–26 of Algorithm ArtUC . Baseline outperforms the
algorithm of [68] in terms of preserving data utility, because it employs (k, km)-anonymity
instead of k-anonymity and set-based generalization instead of hierarchy-based generaliza-
tion for diagnosis codes.
5.1. Experimental setup
We have implemented all algorithms in C++ and ran all experiments on an Intel i7 at
3.2 GHz with 32 GB of RAM running Mac OS X 10.8. In our experiments, we use two RT-
datasets, namely EHRD and Informs. Each record in these datasets contains demograph-
ics and ICD-9 codes.The EHRD dataset is proprietary (provided by a university medical
center). The Informs dataset is publicly available at https://sites.google.com/site/
informsdataminingcontest/data. The processing and analysis of these datasets was per-
formed in a privacy-preserving way, according to standard practicies and policies. Table 5
summarizes the characteristics of the EHRD and Informs datasets.
In our experiments, the default anonymization values were set as follows:
k = 10, m = 2, δ = 0.04, and  = 0.06 · |#distinctcodes|
The hierarchies were constructed as in [72]. To experiment with different types of utility
requirements, we use 9 different utility constraint sets (illustrated in Table 6). The default
utility constraint set for EHRD is UC 1 (see Table 6a). For instance, each utility constraint
in this utility constraint set is comprised of:
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UC 1 u1={[0:12),All,Chapter1}, u2={[12:24),All,Chapter2},. . .
UC 2 u1={[0:12),All,Section1},u2={[12:24),All,Section2},. . .
UC 3 u1={[0:12),All,{001.*}},u2={[12:24),All,{002.*}},. . .
UC 4 u1={[0:24),All,Chapter1}, u2={[24:48),All,Chapter2 . . .
UC 5 u1={[0:24),All,Section1},u2={[24:48),All,Section2},. . .
UC 6 u1={[0:24),All,{001.*}},u2={[24:48),All,{002.*}},. . .
UC 7 u1={[0:50),All,Chapter1}, u2={[50:150),All,Chapter2},. . .
UC 8 u1={[0:50),All,Section1},u2={[50:150),All,Section2},. . .
UC 9 u1={[0:50),All,{001.*}},u2={[50:150),All,{002.*}},. . .
(a)
UC1 u1={All, [1918 : 1938),[0 : 18), [0 : 10), All, Chapter1}, u2={All, [1918 : 1938),[18 : 32), [0 : 10), All, Chapter1},. . .
UC2 u1={All, [1918 : 1938),[0 : 18), [0 : 10), All, Sections1}, u2={All, [1918 : 1938), [18 : 32), [0 : 10), All, Sections1},. . .
UC3 u1={All, [1918 : 1938),[0 : 18), [0 : 10), All, {001.∗}}, u2={All, [1918 : 1938),[18 : 32), [0 : 10), All, {002.∗}},. . .
UC4 u1={All, [1918 : 1968),[0 : 18), [0 : 10), All, Chapter1}, u2={All, [1918 : 1968),[18 : 32), [0 : 10), All, Chapter1},. . .
UC5 u1={All, [1918 : 1968),[0 : 18), [0 : 10), All, Sections1}, u2={All, [1918 : 1968),[18 : 32), [0 : 10), All, Sections1},. . .
UC6 u1={All, [1918 : 1968),[0 : 18), [0 : 10), All, {001.∗}}, u2={All, [1918 : 1968),[18 : 32), [0 : 10), All, {002.∗}},. . .
UC7 u1={All, [1918 : 2001),[0 : 18), [0 : 10), All, Chapter1}, u2={All, [1918 : 2001),[18 : 32), [0 : 10), All, Chapter1},. . .
UC8 u1={All, [1918 : 2001),[0 : 18), [0 : 10), All, Sections1}, u2={All, [1918 : 2001),[18 : 32), [0 : 10), All, Sections1},. . .
UC9 u1={All, [1918 : 2001),[0 : 18), [0 : 10), All, {00.∗}}, u2={All, [1918 : 2001),[18 : 32), [0 : 10), All, {002.∗}},. . .
(b)
Table 6: Utility constraint sets used in our experiments with (a) the EHRD dataset, and (b)
the Informs dataset. In each utility constraint set, the interval [x:y) contains all integers that
are at least x and smaller than y. Chapter1 (respectively, Section1 and {001.*}) denotes the set
of diagnosis codes whose immediate ancestor is the first Chapter (respectively, Section and 3-digit
code 001) in the ICD-9 taxonomy [1].
• an interval [0:12), containing 12 consecutive values in Age, which are at least 0 and less
than 12,
• the value All in Gender, and
• all diagnosis codes belonging in the same Chapter in the ICD-9 taxonomy [1].
The ICD-9 taxonomy organizes diagnosis codes into more general, semantically related con-
cepts. The ICD-9 taxonomy for the diagnosis codes that are contained in the dataset of
Figure 1a is depicted in Figure 6. The leaves contain the most detailed diagnosis codes,
which have 4 or 5 numerical digits, and the immediate ancestors of leaves are 3-digit diag-
nosis codes. For example, the diagnosis code 053.20 (Herpes zoster dermatitis of eyelid) is a
leaf, whose immediate ancestor is the 3-digit diagnosis code 053 (Herpes zoster). In turn, the
immediate ancestors of 3-digit codes are Sections and those of Sections are Chapters. For ex-
ample, the immediate ancestor of 053 is the Section {050, . . . , 059} (Viral diseases accompanied
by exanthem), and the immediate ancestor of the latter is the Chapter {001,. . . ,139} (Infectious
and parasitic diseases). Last, the immediate ancestor of all Chapters is the root value of the











Figure 6: ICD-9 taxonomy of diagnosis codes in the dataset of Figure 1a.
Note that the utility constraint sets UC 1 and UC 3 in Table 6a contain the same elements
in the demographic attributes but different elements in the set-valued attribute. Further-
more, Chapter1 of the utility constraint u1 in UC 1 contains all the diagnosis codes in {001.*}
of u1 in UC 3, which represents the codes with immediate ancestor 001. Thus, UC 1 is less
restrictive than UC 3 and is expected to be satisfied with less generalization. For the same
reason UC 1 is less restrictive than UC 2, which is less restrictive than UC 3. Similar relations
exist among UC 4 to UC 6 and among UC 7 to UC 9 in Table 6a. In addition, it is easy to see
that u1 in UC 7 is less restrictive than u1 in UC 1, because its element [0:50) in Age contains
the element [0:12) of the utility constraint u1 in UC 1.
To evaluate data utility, we use the NCP , UL, and ARE measures (see Section 3.2).
Lower values of these measures indicate lower data distortion and are preferable. Note that
none of the methods optimizes ARE directly, since the methods do not take as input the
query workloads. We use workloads of 100 queries, involving demographics and/or diagnosis
codes, which retrieve random values and/or sets of 2 diagnosis codes by default, following
[39, 47]. Since ARE reflects the average number of records that are retrieved incorrectly as
part of answering a workload of queries, low ARE scores imply that anonymized data can
be used to estimate the number of patients having certain demographic values and diagnosis
codes fairly accurately.
5.2. Data utility comparison
We first evaluate all methods, with respect to the NCP and the UL measure, for varying
δ. The results are reported in Figures 7 - 8. Increasing δ leads both ArtUC and RmR to
create larger clusters, which have higher NCP and lower UL. On the other hand, Baseline
is not affected by δ, because it creates clusters of fixed size, which favor the anonymization




































(c) Additional data utility loss
Figure 7: Utility comparison of Baseline, RmR and ArtUC for the EHRD dataset.
when we used EHRD dataset, achieving lower scores by 620% on average, while its UL
scores were higher by 240% on average. The results for the Informs dataset, shown in
Figure 8, are qualitatively similar to those of Figure 7. Specifically, ArtUC achieved lower
scores by 662.07% on average, while its UL scores were higher by 138.01% on average.
This indicates that the pre-generalization of demographic attributes, used by Baseline,
incurs high information loss, unlike the cluster formation and cluster merging strategies
that are employed by ArtUC . In addition, the NCP scores of ArtUC and RmR were equal
and the UL scores of ArtUC were 50% better on average (and up to 92% better, for the
case of EHRD, and 32.24% better on average for the case of Informs). This shows that
ArtUC is able to satisfy the utility constraint set, while preserving the information in both
demographics and diagnosis codes. Moreover, Figure 7c presents the additional data utility
loss incurred by using RmR or Baseline instead of ArtUC . The additional data utility
loss for RmR is computed as:
1
2






The computation assumes that NCP and UL are equally important and is similar for Base-
line. As can be seen in Figure 7c, the additional data utility loss for RmR is 18.6% on
average and that for Baseline is 252.1% on average. The result in Figure 8c is similar.
In the following experiments, we evaluate all methods, with respect to the ARE measure.
The results are shown in Figures 9 - 10. For each dataset, we use three query workloads,
namely W1, W2, and W3. In summary:









































(c) Additional data utility loss





































Figure 9: Utility comparison using ARE for the EHRD dataset.
• The queries inW2 retrieve information based on the value of one demographic attribute
and one diagnosis code.
• The queries in W3 retrieve information based on two diagnosis codes.
For example, a query in W2, which was used in the experiments with the EHRD dataset,
can retrieve the number of patients associated with Age=32 and Chronic obstructive asthma.
As expected, the effectiveness of the evaluated methods is affected by the query work-
loads. For example, Baseline, which favors the anonymization of diagnosis codes, has the
worst effectiveness for W1 and the best for W3 (see Figures 9a and 9c). ArtUC is more
effective than Baseline for both W1 (e.g., 812% better, on average in the case of EHRD
and 736.60% better on average, in the case of Informs) andW2 (34% better, on average, in
the case of EHRD, and 17.53% better, on average, in the case of Informs). These results



































Figure 10: Utility comparison using ARE for the Informs dataset.
and diagnosis codes, which are the most important when publishing RT -datasets. On the
other hand, RmR merges together clusters that have semantically distant values in the de-
mographic attributes, and this results in high ARE scores, particularly for W2 and W3 (see
Figures 9b and 9c for EHRD and Figures 10b and 10c for Informs). For example, note in
Figures 9b and 9c, that ArtUC is more effective than RmR forW1 (47% better, on average),
W2 (123% better, on average), and W3 (14% better on average).
In summary, the results in Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10 demonstrate that ArtUC preserves
data utility better than Baseline and RmR. In particular, Baseline did not permit
accurate analysis on demographics, while RmR did not support the intended analysis tasks.
Having established that ArtUC is more accurate than Baseline and RmR, we will only
report results for ArtUC in the following sections. In addition, the results using the EHRD
dataset are quantitatively similar to those using the Informs dataset. Thus, for brevity, we
will only report results for EHRD in the following sections.
5.3. Data utility evaluation of ArtUC (fixed utility constraint set, varying parameters)
In this section, we examine the data utility offered by our method, when there is a fixed
utility constraint set and varying anonymization parameters. Specifically, we use the utility
constraint set UC 1 of Table 6 and report results for UL and ARE , when we vary the size of
the input dataset |D| and the values of parameters k, m and δ parameters.
In the first set of experiments, we evaluate the information loss on diagnosis codes, using
the UL measure. Specifically, we varied the parameters k, m, δ, as well as the size of the
input RT -dataset |D|, and present the results with respect to UL in Figure 11. As can be






































(d) Varying input dataset size |D|
Figure 11: Utility comparison using UL
enforce stricter privacy requirements. To satisfy these requirements, ArtUC applied more
generalization which led to higher formation loss.
On the contrary, as illustrated in Figure 11c, the UL scores are lower, for larger δ values.
This is because a larger δ leads our method to create larger clusters, which favor the anony-
mization of diagnosis codes with low information loss. Similarly, increasing the dataset size,
resulted in lower UL scores, as shown in Figure 11d. This is because larger datasets contain
combinations of diagnosis codes which appear in more records3. Thus, the anonymization
of these datasets can be performed with lower information loss.
In the following experiments, we evaluate data utility, using the ARE measure, and the
workloadsW1,W2, andW3, used in Section 5.2. Specifically, Figures 12a, 12b, and 12c show
the ARE scores, for varying k, and for the workloadsW1,W2, andW3, respectively. Observe
that larger values for k, as expected, increase information loss. However, the ARE scores
3In this experiment, each dataset contains randomly selected records, and larger datasets contain all




























































Figure 13: ARE measure for varying δ.
remain relatively low, even when k = 100, which is 20 times larger than the commonly used
value for k [46]. Figures 13a, 13b, and 13c illustrate the ARE scores, for varying δ, and for the
workloads W1, W2, and W3, respectively. The tested values of δ were in [6 · 10−3, 8 · 10−2],
which correspond to the minimum and maximum number of clusters constructed by our
method, respectively. NCP did not exceed δ in all tested cases. As can be seen, increasing
δ leads to higher ARE scores for W1 and W2 but to lower ARE scores for W3. This is
because, ArtUC creates larger clusters of similar diagnosis codes when δ is larger, which
lead to higher information loss on the demographic attributes but to lower information loss
on the diagnosis codes. We also report the ARE scores for varying m in Figures 14a and 14b,
which correspond to W2 and W3, respectively. Since varying m only affects the information
loss on diagnosis codes, we do not report the result for W1. Note that increasing m results























Figure 14: ARE measure for varying m.
Setup Utility constraint set UC
1
UC 1 = { {[0:12),All,Chapter1}, {[12:24),All,Chapter2}, . . . }
UC 2 = { {[0:12),All,Sections1}, {[12:24),All,Sections2}, . . . }
UC 3 = { {[0:12),All, {001.*}}, {[12:24),All, {001.*}}, . . . }
2
UC 1 = { {[0:12),All,Chapter1}, {[12:24),All,Chapter2}, . . . }
UC 4 = { [0:24),All,Chapter1}, {[24:48),All,Chapter2, . . . }
UC 7 = { {[0:50),All,Chapter1}, {[50:150),All,Chapter2}, . . . }
Table 7: Utility constraint sets, used in each setup (taken from Table 6).
when m is larger, and this leads ArtUC to apply more generalization.
5.4. Data utility evaluation of ArtUC (varying utility constraint sets, fixed parameters)
In this section, we examine the data utility offered by our method, when all parameters
are fixed to their default values and various utility constraint sets are used. In particular,
we study how the specified utility constraint set affects: (i) the percentage of suppressed
diagnosis codes, (ii) the UL measure, and (iii) the ARE measure. We do not report results
for NCP , because its value was equal to the specified threshold δ = 0.04. We used two
different setups of utility constraint sets, which are presented in Table 7. In Setup 1, ArtUC
is applied with UC 1, UC 2, or UC 3. In Setup 2, one of the utility constraint sets UC 1, UC 4,
and UC 7 is used instead. As we move from left to right in the first row of Table 7, the utility
constraint sets become more restrictive. That is, UC 1 is the least restrictive set among those
in Setup 1 (see Section 5.1), UC 3 is the most restrictive, and UC 2 lies in between UC 1 and
UC 3. On the contrary, as we move from left to right in the second row Table 7, the utility






































(c) Measuring UL for Setup 2
Figure 15: Data utility for different utility constraint sets (Setup 1 and 2).
In our first experiment, we report the percentage of suppressed diagnosis codes (Figure 15a).
The percentage of suppressed diagnosis codes is the lowest for UC 1, the least restrictive util-
ity constraint set in Setup 1, and it is the highest for UC 3. This is because restrictive utility
constraint sets limit the number of allowable generalizations and force ArtUC to apply sup-
pression, in order to enforce (k, km) anonymity. Suppression is employed only when the use
of generalization is not sufficient to (k, km)-anonymize a cluster. Thus, the percentage of
suppressed diagnosis codes is relatively small (e.g., 1% for UC 2 and 5.09% for UC 3) and
does not exceed the specified threshold .
In the following experiment, we consider the UL metric and in Figure 15b illustrate its
values for the utility constraints sets of Setup 1. Note that UL values decrease between
UC 1 and UC 2 and slightly increase between UC 2 and UC 3. To explain this behavior, we
decompose UL into the utility loss caused by generalization, denoted by ULgen, and the
utility loss caused by suppression, denoted by ULsup (obviously UL = ULsup + ULsup). As
can be seen in Figure 15b, ULgen decreases as the utility constrains become more restrictive
(i.e., moving from UC 1 to UC 2 and UC 3), whereas ULsup follows an opposite trend. This
justifies that the increase in UL for UC 3 is a result of the use of suppression by ArtUC (see
also the percentage of suppression that corresponds to UC 3 in Figure 15a).
In Figure 15c, we use the utility constraint sets of Setup 2. These utility constraint sets
were satisfied without suppression, thus, the UL score decreases as the utility constraint set
becomes less restrictive (from the most strict UC 1 to the more loose UC 7).
Subsequently, we report the ARE scores for both setups. Figures 16a and 16b correspond
to the utility constraint sets of Setup 1 and to the query workloadsW2 andW1, respectively.


















































(e) Setup 2 and workload W3
Figure 16: ARE for different utility constraint sets.
1 since to satisfy UC 3 more generalization and suppression is required. Similar results are in
order for Setup 2; Figures 16c, 16d, and 16e correspond to the query workloadsW1,W2, and
W3, respectively. Specifically, ARE is larger for UC 1, which is the most restrictive utility
constraint set of Setup 2.
In summary, the use of different utility constraint sets affects data utility. For instance,
replacing the utility constraint UC 1 with UC 3, results in higher ULsup and lower ULgen
scores. On the contrary, replacing UC 1 with UC 7, results in high NCP and low UL scores,
as less restrictive constraints lead ArtUC to create larger groups of records. However, in
both cases, our method preserved utility well, according to all tested measures. Furthermore,
our method was able to generate data that can be used to support the intended studies, as
the utility constraints were always satisfied.
5.5. Efficiency evaluation of ArtUC
In this section, we evaluate the execution time of our method ArtUC , by varying the








































(c) Varying the dataset size |D|
Figure 17: Execution evaluation.
17c. Figure 17a shows that the runtime of our method decreases with k, as larger values of
k result in larger initial clusters and fewer clusters merging operations. On the other hand,
Figure 17b shows that runtime increases with m, as there are more combinations of diagnosis
codes that must be protected. Notice though that the increase is subquadratic. Finally,
Figure 17c shows that the execution time of our method increases with |D|4. The increase is
also subquadratic in |D|. Overall, the results show that our method can anonymize datasets
containing thousands of patient records within minutes.
6. Discussion
This section explains how our work can be extended to deal with different types of
healthcare data and privacy requirements. In addition, it discusses limitations, which suggest
opportunities for further research.
Our approach was developed for RT -datasets in which the set-valued attribute contains
diagnosis codes. However, in certain applications, a patient record may also contain proce-
dural codes (e.g., CPT codes which describe medical, surgical, and diagnostic services [55]),
as well as medications. Extending our approach to deal with such datasets requires forming
a set-valued attribute that contains all different types of codes. More formally, multiple
set-valued attributes, Al+1, . . . , Al+m, can be modeled as a single set-valued attribute AL,
whose domain (set of possible values) contains every value in the domain of Al+1 or Al+2
or . . . Al+m, preceded by the domain name. For example, the domain of AL contains a
value Al+1.u to represent the value u of Al+1. This is simply to distinguish between values
4In this experiment, we used random subsets of the dataset, whose records were contained in all larger
sets.
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of different attributes. In addition, each element vAL of a utility constraint must contain
values of a single attribute, to prevent the generalization of values of different attributes
(e.g., diagnosis and procedural codes), which are difficult to interpret.
Furthermore, our approach aims to prevent identity disclosure, which is the most im-
portant privacy requirement for healthcare data. This is suggested by the fact that “all the
publicly known examples of re-identification of personal information have involved identity
disclosure” [15] and by the fact that the majority of healthcare data anonymization methods
focus on preventing identity disclosure. However, our algorithm can be extended to prevent
attribute disclosure [72], when there are sensitive diagnosis codes with which patients are
not willing to be associated. To achieve this, we may appropriately modify our adaptation
of the CBA algorithm used in Steps 19, 20 and 25 of Algorithm ArtUC (see also Appendix
A) so that it enforces (k, lm)-diversity [61] on the sensitive diagnosis codes of each cluster.
The (k, lm)-diversity principle guarantees that an attacker who knows all the values of the
demographic attributes and up to m diagnosis codes of a patient cannot associate these
diagnosis codes with any combination of sensitive diagnosis codes, with probability larger
than 1
l
, where l ≥ 2 is a parameter specified by data owners. This modification requires to
apply additional generalization to ensure that any combination of p and sensitive diagnosis
codes appears in at least l records of the anonymized cluster. Thus, this modification incurs
additional information loss and computational overhead. The evaluation of the extended
version of our algorithm that enforces (k, lm)-anonymity is left as future work.
Moreover, alike other data anonymization methods, our approach assumes that data
owners are able to select appropriate values for the parameters k and m, which model the
privacy requirements, as well as for δ and , which model the maximum allowable level of
information loss caused by generalizing demographic attributes and by suppressing diagnosis
codes, respectively. However, configuring these parameters in an optimal manner, for a given
RT -dataset, is not straightforward.
For example, the ArtUC algorithm stops (i.e., the utility requirements are not satisfied)
when: (I) the NCP of the anonymized dataset with respect to the demographics exceeds the
specified δ (Step 16), or (II) the number of suppressed diagnosis codes exceeds the specified
 (Step 26). In these cases, the satisfaction of the utility requirements (requirements 1 and
3 of Problem 1) is treated as a hard constraint, and thus the algorithm does not produce
an anonymized dataset. Our choice clearly reflects the semantics of utility constraints,
which dictate that a group of records that is “too” generalized is useless for analysis, and is
consistent with prior work [45, 46, 47].
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An alternative choice would be to relax the utility requirements, by setting larger δ and
. This raises the question of how to relax the requirements in a way that is easy and
intuitive for the data owners, given that their specification is data-dependent. To address
this question, we propose to involve the data owner in the execution of our algorithm, so
that they can see select when the information loss with respect to the relational attributes
and the number of suppressions are acceptable, as the algorithm progresses. This makes
our algorithm an ”any time” method, in the spirit of [20]. This can be easily done by the
following two adaptations of our algorithm. The first adaptation is to perform generalization
after the current step 3. The NCP of this dataset gives the maximum possible δ that the
user can set. Then, to perform generalization of each cluster after its creation and output
the current NCP of the resultant dataset, which will get smaller as more clusters as created.
The data owner can stop the cluster formation phase, when the NCP is sufficiently small.
After that, the algorithm will continue into cluster merging. The second adaptation is to
output the total number of suppressed diagnosis codes after step 12 of GenDiag. The data
owner can stop the execution of the algorithm when the number of suppressions is deemed
“too” high. As shown in our experiments, the number of suppressions is very small or zero
in practice, so the data owner will not have to examine the output many times, which makes
the adaptation easy to use. We acknowledge that the data owner may need to examine
other data quality indicators in addition to NCP and number of suppressed diagnosis codes.
Towards this goal, we aim to incorporate our algorithm, together with the adaptations, in
the SECRETA anonymization tool [60]. The tool offers a GUI that outputs many data
utility indicators that may assist the data owner towards the specification of δ and .
Our approach aims to produce an anonymized RT -dataset that remains useful for in-
tended analytic tasks, modeled with utility constraints, as well as for general analytic tasks.
However, in a different setting, the anonymized dataset needs to remain useful for building
a pre-determined data mining model (e.g., a classifier). In this setting, a different anonymi-
zation methodology which aims to preserve data utility for the specified data mining model
(in the spirit of [53]) may preserve data utility better.
Last, our approach considers an unordered set of diagnosis codes, as the existing al-
gorithms for anonymizing RT -datasets [31, 61] do. However, certain applications, such
as longitudinal studies, require ordered sets (or ordered multisets) of diagnosis codes [69].
Anonymizing such data in a utility-preserving way is challenging because it requires pre-
serving the sequentiality of data. To the best of our knowledge, the problem has not been
considered and serves as an interesting avenue for future work.
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7. Conclusions
Publishing datasets that contain demographics and diagnosis codes (RT -datasets) is
important, in the context of several medical analysis tasks. To preserve the privacy and
utility of RT -datasets, we proposed an approach that enforces (k, km)-anonymity, while
satisfying intended analysis requirements with minimal information loss. In particular, we
introduced the concept of utility constraints for RT -datasets, to limit the amount of data
generalization, and developed an algorithm that constructs (k, km)-anonymous clusters of
records, using generalization and suppression. Experiments using a dataset containing over
200, 000 electronic health records showed that our algorithm is effective at preserving data
utility and also efficient.
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Appendix A. (k, km)-anonymization
In this appendix, we devise a method for (k, km)-anonymizing a cluster of records in a
way that satisfies the utility constraint set and incurs minimal information loss according
to the UL measure. Our method is called GenDiag and is based on the CBA algorithm
[45], discussed in Section 2.2. GenDiag differs from CBA in that it enforces km-anonymity.
The pseudocode of our method is illustrated in Algorithm GenDiag. Our method takes as
input a cluster of records C, a utility constraint set U , and the anonymization parameters k
and m, and it outputs a (k, km)-anonymous cluster C ′ corresponding to C and the number
of diagnosis codes s that have been suppressed from C.
Algorithm: GenDiag
Input: A cluster of records C, a utility constraint set U , and the anonymization parameters k and m.
Output: A (k, km)-anonymous cluster C′ corresponding to C and the number of diagnosis codes s that have been
suppressed from C.
1 Initialize C′ = C and s = 0.
2 Let Q be the set that contains sets of diagnosis codes, each of which contains up to m codes and appears in fewer than
k records of C′.
3 while Q is not empty do
4 Let p be the element of Q that appears in the largest number of records.
5 while p appears in fewer than k records of C′ do
6 Find codes u and u′, such that (a) u is contained in p, (b) u and u′ are contained in the same utility
constraint of U , and (c) UL(u˜) is minimum, where u˜ is the generalized diagnosis code containing the set of
diagnosis codes that appear in u or u′.
7 if u and u′ are found then
8 Replace u and u′ by u˜ in p, Q and in all records of C′.
9 else while p appears in fewer than k records of C do
10 Let e be the element of p that appears in the minimum number of records of C.
11 Increase s by the number of diagnosis codes that appear in e.
12 Suppress e from p, Q and all records of C′.
13 ;
14 Remove p from Q.
15 return C′ and s.
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In Step 1, GenDiag initializes the output variables C ′ ans s, and in Step 2, it finds
all sets of up to m diagnosis codes that appear in fewer than k records of the cluster and
stores them in set Q. Next, it iterates over these sets, in decreasing order of frequency
(number of records of the cluster in which these sets appear) and performs generalization
and/or suppression (Steps 3–14). Specifically, for a set of diagnosis codes p with element
u, a generalized diagnosis code u˜ is created (Steps 6–8). The generalized diagnosis code
u˜ contains all the diagnosis codes of u as well as additional codes from the same utility
constraint (encoded by code u′ in Step 6), so that the utility constraint set U is satisfied.
Additionally, GenDiag chooses u and u′ so that their generalization u˜ incurs minimal
information loss (Step 6). If u and u′ are found then the generalization is performed (Step
7–8). Otherwise, GenDiag iteratively suppresses, from the element p, the diagnosis code
that appears in the minimum number of records in the cluster, and it keeps, in variable s,
the summation of suppressed diagnosis codes (Steps 9–12).
Generalization and suppression are performed until the set of codes p appears in at least
k records of the cluster, and, after that, p is not considered again (Step 14). When the loop
of Steps 3–14 terminates, cluster C ′ is (k, km)-anonymous. Thus, GenDiag outputs cluster
C ′ and the total number of suppressed diagnosis codes s (Step 15). Example 6 illustrates
the operation of GenDiag.
Example 6. Let us apply GenDiag to the set of records {0,1,2,3} of Figure 1a using the
utility constraint set of Table 4 and parameters k = 2 and m = 2 (the input set corresponds
to the union of clusters C1 = {0,1} and C2 = {2,3} formed in the example of Section 4.2).
Initially, the set of diagnosis codes {493.2, 053.20}, which is contained in fewer than two
records, is added into Q (Step 2). Next, the element p = {493.2, 053.20} is retrieved, the pair
053.20,053.71, and the generalized diagnosis code (053.20, 053.71) is created (Steps 4–6). To
verify, note that 053.71 is contained in the same utility constraint with 053.20 and that the
UL of (0.5320, 053.71) is minimum. Note also that 493.2 (i.e., the other code in p) cannot be
generalized with any other diagnosis code, as this would violate the utility constraint set of
Table 4.
Following that, GenDiag replaces all occurrences of the code 053.20 in the input set with
(053.20, 053.71), and p becomes {493.2, (053.20,053.71)} (Step 8). Since p now appears in three
records, it is removed from Q (Steps 14), and GenDiag returns the anonymized output set
(illustrated by the first 4 rows of the dataset in Figure 3).
Appendix B. Complexity of GenDiag
Let C be the input cluster, β be the maximum number of diagnosis codes contained in
any record of the cluster C, and γ be the total number of distinct diagnosis codes in the
49
records of the cluster C. Let also Q be the set that is comprised of sets of diagnosis codes,
each of which contains up to m codes and appears in fewer than k records of C. Last, let p
be the element of Q that contains the larger number of diagnosis codes.






] + [|Q| · log(|Q|)]) time. The
first term in square brackets is the time to construct Q (Step 2), and the second term is the
time to sort Q. Sorting is required by the next steps of GenDiag, to access the elements of
Q in decreasing frequency order. The while loop of Steps 3–14 is performed O(|Q|) times,
and each iteration of Steps 5–12 needs O(|p|2 · γ + |p| · |C|)) time. Thus, the while loop of
Steps 3–14 takes O(|Q| · (|p|2 · γ + |p| · |C|)) time.

















+ |Q| · (log(|Q|) +m2 · γ +m · |C|))
since |p| is at most m.
Appendix C. Time complexity of ArtUC
To compute the time complexity of ArtUC , we compute the complexity of each of its
phases. In the following, we denote the size of a given a set S with |S|.
Record grouping requires a single pass of the RT-dataset. Thus, it can be performed in
O(|D|) time.
Cluster formation requires O(∑
G∈G
|G|2) time, where G is the set of clusters formed in
Steps 1 and 2. For each group G ∈ G, ArtUC compares a random records with all
others in the set (Step 8) which can be performed in O(|G|2) time. Note that the
generalization with Definition 2 is performed in an incrementally fashion. Thus, it can
be performed in constant time. Also, the final Steps 15–16 need O(|C|) time and do
not affect the overall complexity.
Cluster merging Step 17 can be implemented with a multidimensional sorting in O(λ·|C|·
log(|C|)) time, where λ is the number of dimensions, i.e., the number of demographic
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attributes. The repeat/until loop of Steps 18–22 is executed at most O(|C|2) times.
The time needed to execute Steps 19–22 once is O(µ), where O(µ) is the cost of
executing our adaptation of the CBA algorithm with input the two larger clusters of
set C (see Appendix A for more details). In summary, the repeat/until loop can be
done in O(|C|2 · µ) time. Thus in total, the cluster merging step can be performed in
O(|C|2 · µ) time.
(k, km)-anonymization requires O(∑
C∈C
(cba(C)) time.
Therefore, the cost time consuming phases of ArtUC are cluster formation and merging,
and the time complexity of ArtUC is O(
∑
G∈G
|G|2 + |C|2 · µ).
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